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A B S T R A C T
THE RECENT ECONOMIC CRISIS HAS LED TO AN UPSWING IN MIGRATION FROM THE MEDI-
TERRANEAN COUNTRIES OF EUROPE TOWARDS ITS CENTRAL AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT 
HUBS. THIS OVERALL INCREASE IN MIGRATION ALSO INCLUDES HIGH NUMBERS OF THE 
SO-CALLED SKILLED MIGRANTS, CONSISTING MAINLY, THOUGH NOT EXCLUSIVELY, OF 
YOUNG PEOPLE MOVING WITHIN EUROPE FOR STUDY OR SPECIALISATION, OR SEEKING 
EMPLOYMENT THAT MATCHES THEIR SKILLS PROFILE. IT IS NO COINCIDENCE THEN THAT THIS 
NEW TREND FOR SKILLED MIGRATION WITHIN EUROPE FORMS THE MAIN THRUST OF THE 
COGNITIVE AND RESEARCH INTERESTS OF SOCIOLOGISTS, ECONOMISTS AND MIGRATION 
GEOGRAPHERS. THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO RECONSTRUCT THE THEORETICAL DEBATE 
ON SKILLED MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF WHAT IS PERHAPS TOO HASTILY DEFINED AS 
A “KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY”, THROUGH A BROAD AND SYSTEMATIC CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE.
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1 As referred in the last Report on intra-EU Labour Mobility: “In 2016, there were roughly 11.8 million EU-28 movers in total. This 
shows that the number of EU-28 movers had further increased compared to 2015, at a similar pace as it had increased in the previous years 
[…] Germany and the UK remain by far the main countries of residence hosting almost 50 % of all EU-28 movers in 2016 and their number 
of EU-28 movers was growing faster than EU average compared to 2015 […] Around half of all movers across the EU-28 Member States are 
Romanian, Polish, Italian and Portuguese (in order by size)” (Fries-Tersch, 2018: 12-13).
INTRODUCTION
The recent economic crisis has led to an upswing 
in migration from the Mediterranean countries of 
Europe towards its central and northern develop-
ment hubs1. This overall increase in migration 
also includes high numbers of the so-called skilled 
migrants, consisting mainly, though not exclusively, 
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of young people moving within Europe for study or 
specialisation, or seeking employment that matches 
their skills profile2.
Whilst movement of this type generally involves 
transfer abroad for a period of more than twelve 
months, which would qualify it for inclusion in the 
category of migration, it often involves a number 
of characteristics that would define it as short-term 
mobility: temporary migration (with regards to a 
specific contract or research project), travelling 
between a number of different bases with periodic 
returns to home, and maintaining relationships 
and frequent contact with the home community 
(Recchi, 2013). In the case of internal transfers 
into supranational jurisdictions (such as between 
different EU countries), the list of characteristics 
also includes the same entitlement to protection as 
provided by the state in which the migrant holds 
citizenship.
In this sense, therefore, the phenomena of 
migration and mobility can often be differentiated 
only by formal definition. Both contribute substan-
tially to the dynamics of globalisation and should 
be considered as an integral and essential part of 
the process of “social transformation” that has 
radically altered the global model of development 
over the last thirty years, and that has increased its 
asymmetry (Castles, 2001). This transformation 
also establishes a new kind of polarisation in the 
flows of highly-skilled migrants within Europe: a 
further increase in the socioeconomic gap between 
countries in the south and those in the north.
Migration and mobility are usually triggered 
by a high level of development in the destination 
country and a state of underdevelopment in the 
country of origin, but they also stimulate and 
generate new development dynamics in both 
countries3. This logic also applies in the case of 
2 International statistics define “high-skilled migration” according to educational and professional levels. The OECD-DIOC database 
(Database of Immigrants in OECD Countries) classifies immigrants according to the ISCED’s stratification (International Standard 
Classification of Education) and identifies as “high-skilled” those migrants who own a third level educational qualification. The WB-OECD 
DIOC-E database, on the other hand, links the educational level with high occupations, classified according to the ISCO’s stratification (In-
ternational Standard Classification of Occupations).
3 In the medium term, however, development even in poor countries does not reduce but stimulate outward flows of migration. This 
phenomenon is known as the “migration hump” (Martin and Taylor, 1996).
high-skilled intra-European migration, which 
promotes (or impedes) the circulation of human 
and social capital, skills and knowledge through 
mobility (or immobility). From this perspective, 
studying the flows of high-skilled migrants which 
enter and leave different countries and the devices 
that facilitate or inhibit this circulation, reveals 
one of the most important dynamics of growth in 
countries attracting knowledge. Likewise, it reveals 
recession, both in home countries which become 
subject to a brain drain, and destination countries 
which discourage or block this mobility. It is no 
coincidence then that this new trend for skilled 
migration within Europe forms the main thrust of 
the cognitive and research interests of sociologists, 
economists and migration geographers. This paper 
aims to reconstruct the theoretical debate on skilled 
migration in the context of what is perhaps too 
hastily defined as a “knowledge society”, through 
a broad and systematic critical analysis of the 
scientific literature.
1. KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY AND KNOWLEDGE MOBILITY: 
THE THEORETICAL POLITICAL FRAMEWORK
Knowledge societies are often referred to when 
tracing the possible development paths of contem-
porary societies (Böhme and Stehr, 1986; Drucker, 
1957, 1969, 1994; Lane, 1966; Stehr, 1994, 2001). 
Additionally addressing the high degree of com-
plexity and contradiction of today’s social systems 
(Bauman, 2002; Beck, 2000; Bell, 1973; Boutang, 
2011; Castells, 2002; Cotesta, 2004; Fumagalli, 
2007; Gallino, 2015; Giddens, 1994; Gorz, 2003; 
Kumar, 2000; Martell, 2011; Sennett, 1999; Tou-
raine, 1993, 2008), this expression also indicates 
the key role that knowledge should play in defining 
N Ú M .  3 9 ,  D E S E M B R E ,  1 8 HIGH-SKILLED MIGRATION AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY. THEORIES, PROCESSES, PERSPECTIVES
23
political actions aimed at constructing a “new” 
model of society (Morin, 2012; Touraine, 2012). In 
this sense, it appears to support the affirmation and 
consolidation of a concept of progress that exists 
solely for knowledge as a strategic resource that can 
guarantee widespread affluence and development of 
the individual, the society and the economy.
As early as 1957, Peter Drucker attributed a 
new function to knowledge with his definition of a 
“new” vision of the world: the notion of order, power, 
development, innovation, research and education 
(Drucker, 1957). But only in his subsequent works, 
as part of a long research career on the transfor-
mations of capitalism and production systems, 
does he specifically mention “knowledge society” 
and “knowledge worker” (Drucker, 1969, 1993). 
The revolution he announced was the substitution 
of the “worker management” of the Taylorist and 
Fordist period with “knowledge management” 
in the current capitalist era. More specifically, he 
referred to employment changes and the growing 
importance of “human capital” in new forms of 
work organisation (Becker, 2008; Schultz, 1971; 
Stehr, 1994). Knowledge is identified as the strategic 
resource, and the management of knowledge is 
crucial to the success and competitiveness of both 
individual businesses and the entire economic and 
social system.
The sociological debate around this “new” 
model of society intensified around the late 1960s 
and 1970s (Kumar, 2000). Many scholars believed 
that the rapid development of information and 
communication technology played a significant 
role in the overall process of transforming contem-
porary societies (Bell, 1973, 1987; Castells, 1989, 
2002; Wiener, 1950). When it arrives at a constant 
flux, information takes on new forms of the past. 
In the economic and business environment, it 
changes from being a simple tool for production 
into an actual product, and information flows are 
placed at the centre of the whole production process 
(Machlup, 1962, 1980, 1982). In the cultural and 
social context, however, the increase in the amount 
of information available and the possibility of ac-
quiring knowledge can to a great extent alter both 
lifestyles and behaviour.
Daniel Bell was one of the first authors that 
recognised the importance of information and 
knowledge in the improved, but still hybrid, social 
configurations. This Harvard sociologist identified 
a new stage in economic and social development, 
where knowledge and information were becoming 
the strategic resource and agent for the transfor-
mation of post-industrial society, just as the com-
bination of energy, raw materials and mechanical 
technology were the drivers for development of 
the industrial society (Bell, 1973: 467; Bell, 1980). 
Manuel Castells talks more specifically about the 
emergence of a new sociotechnological paradigm. 
Castells’ particular area of interest is the idea of 
an open system where the structural element is 
increasingly associated with the exploitation of the 
so-called intangible resources (Castells, 2002). This 
results in a radical transformation of the elements 
of space and time “through the combined effect of 
the paradigm of information technology and the 
processes and social forms induced by the current 
historical change” (Castells, 2002: 435). According 
to Castells’ theoretical processes, it can be asserted 
that contemporary societies tend to form around 
flows: “capital flows, information flows, technology 
flows, flows of organisational interaction, flows 
of images, sounds and symbols” (Castells, 2002: 
472). Hence the definition of the flow space as 
the “material organisation of social time-division 
practices that operate through flows” (ibid.: 473). 
In contexts with “improved” networking, all forms 
of mobility –including the geographical mobility 
of knowledge and workers– appear to be within 
the range of possibilities and are almost ceaselessly 
encouraged (Urry, 2007), sometimes leading to a 
chain of events that generates new material con-
ditions and new types of ideal (Sassen, 2008) that 
do not always reflect the actual situation.
An approach of this kind is the guiding prin-
ciple behind the European strategy detailed in 
documents such as Delors’ white paper (European 
Commission, 1994), the Lisbon objectives (Euro-
pean Council, 2000) and the Europe 2020 strategy 
(European Commission, 2010). This strategy calls 
on member states to adopt measures for smart and 
inclusive growth through investment in research, 
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development, innovation, education and training. 
Articulations in this direction are increasing in 
speed and intensity and are linked to general 
cultural considerations. Furthermore, with the 
Bologna process (European Commission, 1999) 
and its developments in the Education and Train-
ing 2020 strategic framework (European Council, 
2009), and with regards also to other initiatives 
supporting the mobility of scholars and researchers, 
the vision of a common European destiny appears 
on the horizon possibly for the first time, although 
it is not particularly constraining. The European 
Union is making concrete efforts to support this 
strategy in many different ways. These are the 
possibilities offered, for example, by the Erasmus 
Plus programme –an integrated intervention plan 
involving resources for study, training, work expe-
rience or volunteering abroad– or by the Horizon 
2020 research and innovation programme, which 
has made almost €80 billion of funding available 
for a seven-year period (2014-2020) to promote 
and enhance worthy collaborations for creating 
a European Research Area (ERA). The European 
Research Council (ERC) funding initiatives have 
similar operational objectives, although they aim 
more specifically to achieve and share scientific 
excellence in all disciplines.
The concept of knowledge organisation is also 
gaining ground in line with the economic, organi-
sational and sociocultural transformations attribut-
able to the processes of innovation described above. 
Knowledge organisation is an actual “cognitive 
system” that restores the image of “dematerialised” 
organisations and companies whose distinguishing 
features are to be found in the very cognitive nature 
of the environment, the universality of knowledge 
and skills and the relationship networks developed 
inside and outside the workplace (Senge, 1990; 
Miggiani, 1994; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1997; Ar-
gyris and Schön, 1998; Butera, 2009). The reflection 
on the circulation of skills emerged against this 
4 Policy interventions in this direction can traditionally be attributed to Lowell’s taxonomy (2002): (1) Return (encouragement); (2) 
Restriction (in respect of potential expatriates); (3) Recruitment (of skilled migrants); (4) Reparation (tax measures imposed on destination 
country as compensation for damage suffered by the country of origin); (5) “Resourcing expatriates” (exploiting diasporas); (6) Retention 
(encouragement by promoting national education and R&D systems).
background and enlightened the most effective 
political strategies to support the economic growth 
of the knowledge-driven economies attracting 
high-skilled migrants from abroad and contrasting 
the expatriation or stimulating the return of the 
national best and brightest4.
The cultural, economic and social consequences 
of this process are carefully and critically examined 
by a substantial number of scholars concerned with 
researching “cognitive capitalism” –an expression 
they favour over “knowledge-based economy” 
(Boutang, 2007; Fumagalli, 2011; Gorz, 2003; 
Marrazzi, 2015; Vercellone, 2006). More specifically, 
theorists of cognitive capitalism try to present an 
accurate depiction of the historical element and 
the conflicting relationship between the two terms 
it comprises:
the term capitalism means the permanence, 
within situations of change, of the fundamental 
invariants of the capitalist system, such as the 
driving role of profit and the centrality of the sal-
ary ratio […]. The term “cognitive” indicates the 
new nature of work, sources of value and forms of 
ownership on which the accumulation of capital 
is based, as well as the contradictions it generates 
(Vercellone, 2009: 32).
The main contradiction can be identified as 
the “value-making” process of all the elements of 
“living work”, and of the emotional, symbolic and 
creative components of the worker’s social life too 
(Boutang, 2007; Fumagalli, 2011). Furthermore, in 
what is often referred to as a “knowledge society”, 
the knowledge acquired is not accompanied by the 
power to simply apply that knowledge to improve 
one’s social standing. Moreover, the new contexts 
are often unable to create the necessary conditions 
for the “potential capital” of knowledge workers 
to emerge and to give them the best opportunity 
to develop their careers. Investing in knowledge is 
a priority that is often not translated into concrete 
interventions, and knowledge workers –especially 
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young people starting to work for the first time– 
often seem to pay the price of the crisis caused by 
speculative capitalism: lower income, job insecurity, 
social status compression and reduced prospects for 
social and professional mobility. In the midst of 
these trends, there is the scientific debate on high-
skilled migration, a particularly articulate debate 
that re-establishes the analytical complexity of the 
phenomenon, to which we will devote attention in 
the following paragraphs.
2. HIGH-SKILLED MIGRATION: TERMINOLOGY OF THE 
CONCEPT AND RESEARCH POSITION
A Google search of the term high-skilled migra-
tion does not identify use of the term in any doc-
ument before 1988. The use of the term increased 
30-fold, however, between 1990 and 2007 (Parsons 
et al., 2014), along with the connotations the phe-
nomenon assumed in public opinion, politics and 
scientific research.
The term is now so diffuse and widely used 
that it is accorded its own entry in encyclopaedic 
dictionaries (Iredale, 2016) and textbooks (Rajan, 
2015). Multiannual research programmes such as 
“Drivers and Dynamics of High-Skilled Migration” 
(IMI, University of Oxford), “High Skilled Migra-
tion in Time of Crisis” (EUI, Fiesole) and “Mobile 
Professionals” (CMR, University of Sussex) invested 
a great deal of effort and intellectual resources in 
examining and analysing it properly. A specific 
workshop was held on the subject at the 13th IMI-
SCOE Conference in Prague in July 2016, and two 
discussion sessions at the ISA RC31 international 
conference in Doha in November 2016.
This increase in interest coincides with the 
intensification and globalisation of the phenom-
enon, which is becoming more widespread and 
characteristic of internal mobility in northern 
countries of the world. At the same time, however, 
5 We refer here in particular to the two High-Level Dialogues on Migration and Development by the United Nations General Assembly in 
2006 and 2013. With specific reference to the European debate, the topic was first discussed in the communication on the Global Approach on 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM) in 2011 (COM 2011/743) and returned to more recently in the Commission’s communication on establishing 
a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration (COM 385/2016).
there is growing concern over the critical and po-
tentially depressive aspects of the phenomenon on 
the social and economic situations where it is taking 
place. All these aspects combine to distinguish the 
subject as one of the factors, and also one of the 
most reliable indicators, of the transformation 
that brought about changes to production models 
and geopolitical equilibrium throughout the 20th 
century (Arrighi, 1994).
Studies in migration have traditionally focused 
on this particular category of migrants, to draw 
attention to either the damage that results when the 
development potential is removed from the country 
of origin (brain drain) (Bhagwati and Hamada, 
1974), or conversely the positive returns from which 
the country benefits through economic remittances 
in the short term (Grubel and Scott, 1966; Johnson, 
1967) as well as the transfer of social remittances, 
knowledge and investment in the medium-to-long 
term (brain gain) (Findlay, 2002; Docquier and 
Rapoport, 2006; Boeri et al., 2012); studies have also 
paid attention to the effect of scientific diasporas on 
the development of the country of origin (Saxenian, 
2005; Meyer and Brown, 1999; Gamlen, 2014a). The 
second of these tendencies corroborates the deliber-
ations of the official political discourse of the main 
supranational bodies5, where high-skilled migration 
is interpreted as a physiological phenomenon that 
operates for the development of a knowledge-based 
economy. A third tendency, more oriented to the 
paradigm of “social transformation” (Castles, 2001, 
2010; Castles and Miller, 2012: 89-92), observes 
highly-skilled migration because it is indicative 
of the criteria and dynamics of social stratification 
that operate in various historical and geopolitical 
contexts (Cohen, 1987). Particularly, observation 
of the geographical and social mobility paths of 
high-skilled migrants is considered indicative of the 
processes through which human capital is formed 
and made available within knowledge-intensive 
production systems (Mezzadra and Neilsen, 2014).
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International statistical sources estimate that 
high-skilled migrants now represent 30 % of the 
232 million international migrants, 4.1 million of 
these are students (Rajan, 2015). This is a global 
phenomenon, although some regional variations 
are worthy of particular attention, as is the case 
in Europe, where it appears with greater intensity 
and different characteristics when compared with 
overall migration trends over the last 60 years. In 
Europe, official statistics have recorded a gradual 
and increasingly marked upswing in skilled migra-
tion from the Mediterranean countries (including 
Spain) towards the development hubs of the 
northern and central regions of Europe and other 
industrialised OECD and BRICS countries since the 
start of the millennium. The post-2008 economic 
crisis has exacerbated this trend, arousing media 
attention and public opinion6.
3. EVOLUTION OF INTERPRETATIVE MODELS
Empirical evidence suggests that high-skilled 
workers are more likely to emigrate than less skilled 
ones, and tend to move from underdeveloped coun-
tries to more developed countries that show greater 
consideration and offer higher remuneration for 
their specific skills (Ducquier and Machado, 2015). 
How can this phenomenon be interpreted? What 
effects does this mobility have on the country of 
origin? And what effects on the destination country?
3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE
Deliberations on the dynamics of high-skilled 
migration are incorporated in the more general 
6 “Among recent active EU-28 movers, highly educated people were slightly more likely to move (2.3 % have moved) than the total active 
population of working age (1.9 %). This is true for most EU Member States/EFTA countries and the positive difference is particularly high for 
Austrian (highly educated were more than twice as likely to move as the average) and Italian (highly educated were around three times as 
likely to move as the average) active movers” (Canetta et al., 2014: 11).
7 For an overview of the main theories on highly skilled migration, see Brandi (2001) and Beltrame (2007).
8 The economic theory underpinning this type of study argues that, given the decreasing trend of the marginal employment productivity 
curve, not only was the loss of workforce units no detriment to the steady economies of scale for production, but it even contributed to reducing 
unemployment and improving the capital/labour ratio (Beltrame, 2007: 13).
debate around the links between migration and 
development in both countries of origin and desti-
nation countries. It therefore focuses on trends and 
evidence, resulting in alternating views (Castles, 
2008; De Haas, 2012) that emphasise the benefits of 
free circulation of skills, on the one hand, and those 
that denounce the effects of the resulting relative 
deprivation on the other7.
In post-war reconstructed Europe, studies on 
high-skilled migration were based on a combina-
tion of human capital theories and a neo-Marxist 
approach to north-south dependency relationships, 
generating what Beltrame (2007) defines as the 
standard view. In this view, qualified migrations 
were interpreted as the result of “one-way move-
ments from developing countries to developed 
countries as a result of autonomous choices by 
individuals seeking to capitalise on their education, 
and writing off the costs of transferring to another 
country” (Beltrame, 2007: 11). The view acknowl-
edged the adverse effects of migration by top-level 
professionals, but considered it a modest, short-
term phenomenon, largely offset by remittances 
and other factors8 which in the long run could 
have a positive effect on the country of origin by 
stimulating the economy (Grubel and Scott, 1966; 
Johnson, 1967).
In the 1970s the focus of the debate shifted 
from the impact of migration on development to 
the interdependence of migration processes and 
continued underdevelopment in southern coun-
tries across the world (Meyer et al., 2001). In this 
regard, there was greater consensus on the view 
that migration for work (especially skilled work) 
represented the expropriation of skills and abili-
ties, which exacerbated underdevelopment in the 
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country of origin9 rather than easing it. This new 
air of disillusionment contributed to a widespread 
pessimistic interpretation of the impact of skilled 
migration on development, and the first organic 
reflections on the phenomena of brain drain took 
root (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974; Hamada and 
Bhagwati, 1975).
In the late 1990s the pendulum of debate once 
again swung towards more optimistic interpreta-
tions, as the process of globalisation intensified 
and the concept of the knowledge society started. 
In this new view, skilled mobility actually enhanced 
the flexibility, dynamism and diffusion of human 
capital required to support innovation in destina-
tion countries (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997). At the 
same time, however, the inclination to migrate was 
likely to generate positive results in the countries of 
origin too, by generating remittance flows amount-
ing to three times the level of international aid in 
middle and low-income countries, by exceeding the 
level of direct foreign investment (Kapur, 2003), by 
stimulating demand for training and consequently 
increasing the level of investment in education 
(Beltrame, 2007: 14), by transferring the knowledge 
and social attitudes that migrants acquire during 
their stay abroad back to the country of origin 
(Levitt, 1998) and, lastly, by initiating ongoing 
exchanges and transnational contact through the 
diaspora (Saxenian, 2005, 2006; Meyer and Brown, 
1999; Meyers, 2011; Tejada, 2012; Gamlen, 2014a).
The key term in this new phase is “circular 
migration” (Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997), i. e. fluid 
mobility in which the direction and duration of the 
migration is determined by employment opportu-
nities allowed by the governments of destination 
countries. This conception of the migratory path 
re-introduces the German model of the “guest 
worker” into the new framework for “migration 
management”: a 2004 approach shared by the 
hundred member states of the Bern Initiative, which 
9 The economic theories in question for these approaches maintained that the emigration of skilled labour reduced the avail of human 
fiability scale capital in the country of origin, reduced the return on public investment in education, and generated negative externalities 
(Beltrame, 2007: 13).
10 This approach was taken by Beltrame (2007) and developed more recently by Milio et al. (2012), in relation to the new emigration 
of skilled workers from Italy.
asked countries to implement quantitative contain-
ment policies (quotas and/or visas) and qualitative 
selection (by type) for regular immigration –as op-
posed to irregular immigration– to take advantage 
of the migrants’ experience of working abroad after 
they return home (hence “circularity”).
The most recent and articulate contributions 
on the topic, which coincide, however, with the 
current widespread crisis and economic downturn, 
have returned to a more moderate approach to the 
effects of highly-skilled migration, and identify 
both positive and negative contributions (Lowell 
and Findlay, 2001; Docquier and Rapoport, 2006; 
Khadria, 2007)10.
This position returns, on the one hand, to 
previous optimistic theories that predict a future 
of global competition for the best talent (Docquier 
and Machado, 2015), where responsibility for 
reducing the brain drain effect and promoting 
brain gain lies with politicians (Boeri et al., 
2012). On the other hand, however, it exposes the 
duplicity of having a public discourse on migration 
which is considered subordinate to a neoliberal, 
security-driven agenda (Castles, 2008; Gamlen, 
2014b). Some authors have recently pointed out 
that the new references to the market mechanisms 
and self-propelling power of civic society in na-
tional migration policies are in fact linked to a 
demobilisation programme that the national state 
government has introduced in order to develop and 
strengthen controls on global migration (Faist, 
2008). Others, on the other hand, repudiate the 
view that the (pervasive and persistent) promotion 
of ethical responsibility and self-entrepreneurship 
of migrants for development disguises bio-political 
objectives for control (Raghuram, 2009). In a re-
cent special issue of the magazine International 
Migration, it was reported that rhetorical use of the 
link between migration and development disguises 
and legitimises the processes and values  of global 
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capitalism (Glick Schiller, 2012), eliminates or 
avoids the need for political intervention against 
the global stratification of power (De Haas, 2012), 
and sacrifices its potential with the constraints of 
a new security-driven agenda (Sørensen, 2012).
Taking the extensive reconstruction carried 
out by Beltrame (2007) as a basic reference, and 
integrating it with the subsequent contributions 
described above, the following table summarises 
the various positions that have emerged in literature 
regarding the effects that highly-skilled migration 
can have in countries of origin and destination 
countries.
Table 1. Summary of the effects of movement of skilled migrants
Country of origin Destination country
Positive effects
Income generation through economic remittances 
(Graubel and Scott, 1966; Johnson, 1967).
Increasing likelihood of families to invest in edu-
cation and accumulate human capital (Mountford, 
1997; Beine et al., 2001; Stark, 2003).
Increase in level of investment in the education 
sector (Schiff, 2006).
Transformation of sociocultural and organisa-
tional models as a result of social remittances 
and the circulation of knowledge, skills and 
experience (Levitt, 1998; Findlay, 2002; Docquier 
and Rapoport, 2006).
Resumption and start-up of innovative economic 
activities ( Johnson and Rogets, 1998; Cassarino, 
2000; Saxenian, 2002).
Increase in human capital and consequently average 
workforce productivity (Docquier and Rapoport, 
2009).
Tax revenue: returns in the destination country 
for investment in training by the country of origin 
(Docquier and Rapoport, 2009).
Increase in tax revenue generated by expansion of the 
tax base (Docquier and Rapoport, 2009).
Negative effects
Reduction in returns on investment in training 
skilled personnel and lowering of the level of 
human capital (Commander et al., 2003; Docquier 
and Rapoport, 2005).
Depletion of labour supply (in situations where 
there are reduced numbers of workers with suitable 
education and skills levels) (Bhagwati and Hama-
da, 1974; Hamada and Bhagwati, 1975).
Reduction in numbers of young people in society 
(Balduzzi and Rosina, 2011).
Reduction in the growth rate and per capita wealth 
(Hacque and Kim, 1995).
Depletion of human capital in technology fields 
where potential migrants opt instead for develop-
ment of language skills (Lien and Wang, 2005).
Impoverishment of national higher education 
institutions when potential students prefer to 
undertake tertiary education abroad to enhance 
their chance of success in the destination country 
(Faini, 2002).
Movement towards the education infrastructure 
investment priority sector (Schiff, 2006).
Increase in global competitiveness in knowledge-in-
tense sectors (Cerna, 2016).
Decline in national skills levels and progressive 
global transfer of the functions of migration man-
agement (Faist, 2008).
Increase in highly-skilled bio-political control 
devices (Raghuram, 2009).
Increase in global power stratification (De Haas, 
2012).
Radicalisation of security-driven pressures 
(Sørensen, 2012).
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3. CONCLUDING REMARKS: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND 
PATHS TO EXPLORE
What issues remain to be resolved, and what 
paths still need to be investigated and developed? 
To answer this question, we must explore the most 
significant terms used in research, and examine the 
various explanations of these terms provided by the 
phenomena observed to date.
Over time, the theoretical frameworks of which 
we have just reopened the main routes towards 
confirmation and development have focused on 
the main (and often conflicting) areas of interest. 
Within these frameworks, the choice of methodol-
ogy, on the one hand, and availability of data, on 
the other, has determined the variables forming the 
focus of research programmes.
The first area of interest is undoubtedly what 
determines the decision to migrate, in other words, 
the structural reasons and personal motives that 
guide the subjective decision to emigrate.
The neoclassical theory on migration focuses 
on structural reasons as its field of investigation, 
identifying expulsion from the country of origin 
and offers of permits in the destination country as 
the determining factors in the decision to emigrate 
(Ravenstein, 1885; Harris and Todaro, 1970). Van 
Mol (2014) proposes an interesting development 
of this approach that incorporates the different 
macro-structural determinants (economic, social 
and political contexts in the countries of departure 
and arrival) within a “systemic” interpretative 
model (Mabogunje, 1970) through which (in 
the case of student migration as in the study) it is 
given a specific role both in terms of the regula-
tory system operated by intra-university networks 
(meso level) and specific events in the individual’s 
experience (micro level) (Van Mol, 2014: 152-
161). Other authors have included the original 
push-pull approach with considerations relating to 
mobility constraints and incentives depending on 
the different degrees of proximity between countries 
(historical, geographical, linguistic, technological, 
economic, etc). A series of “gravitational” interpre-
11 For an introduction to the topic, see Boccagni and Pollini (2012).
tative models has been identified (Anderson, 1979), 
such as the one recently proposed by Zilin (2010) 
for analysing the determinants of international 
student migration.
Individual motives are another main focus 
for deliberations on what determines migration. 
Although research focusing on the extent that 
socioanagraphic variables (gender, age, level of 
education and occupation) and biographical 
variables (previous experience of migration) have 
on the decision to migrate, the role that symbolic 
and expressive aspects play is also reinforced. The 
Pioneur project has shown how the “emotional 
aspect” (living with a partner of a different na-
tionality or, in a not insignificant number of cases, 
being a homosexual and distancing oneself from 
social control in the home country) is the reason 
for most intra-European mobility (Recchi, 2013: 
129). The survey carried out by the EUI, on the other 
hand, points to “cultural-symbolic factors” such as 
corruption, absence of meritocracy, nepotism and 
a gerontocratic employment market structure as 
constituting the new and powerful determinants 
of recent high-skilled emigration from the most 
fragile EU countries (Triandafyllidou and Gropas, 
2014).
The second area of interest concerns mobility 
and integration models.
Deliberations on models of integration are 
extensive and include as many possible interpreta-
tions as there are aspects defining the phenomenon 
(economic integration, social integration, cultural 
integration, etc)11. With special regards to the inte-
gration of highly-skilled migrant workers, we would 
like to refer to just two very different approaches 
that each in their own way and from their own 
perspective help to re-establish the image of the 
high-skilled migrant as an intelligent being who 
has managed to escape.
Confirmation of the status of escapee comes 
with recognition of the strength of the transna-
tional ties that high-skilled migrants maintain 
with their family, friends and professional circles 
in their home countries. The recent abundance of 
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literature on the transnationalism of high-skilled 
migrants indicates that there are multiple levels of 
identification and adherence to them, and explores 
the structure of relationship networks and the 
quantity and quality of exchanges with the home 
community in attempts to confirm the circular 
nature of this type of migration (Glick Schiller et 
al., 1995; Portes, 1997; Bauböck and Faist, 2010).
Analysing all the different levels involves extend-
ing the identification of structural types that influ-
ence the processes of economic migration. Recchi 
noted that the professional destination of mobile 
European citizens often depends on whether they 
come from countries in the West or East of Europe, 
concluding that “new European citizens have met 
with paths of descending social mobility, at least in 
the early years of migration” (Recchi, 2013: 120).
Critical reflection on the processes of accumu-
lation in the knowledge capitalism era interprets 
migration as a device for the optimal constitution, 
distribution and subordination of human capital, 
and consequently takes as its key variables how 
precarious and temporary contractual relationships 
are, and whether unskilled and skilled work are 
interchangeable (or overlapping), to investigate 
the trajectories of “different” types of integration 
by highly-skilled migrants and to produce results, 
which is not always successful (Mezzadra and 
Neilsen, 2014).
We have illustrated the main directions the 
literature takes in analysing the impact of high-
skilled migration on both the country of origin 
and the destination country, and in conclusion we 
would just reiterate that the elements for analysis 
can be identified as the meeting points between 
processes potentially triggered by the phenomenon 
of high-skilled migration (brain drain, brain gain 
and brain waste) and the subjects (and at the same 
time objects) of these phenomena (country of 
departure, country of destination and migrants). 
Within each of these elements/intersections, inves-
tigations have identified specific trends and critical 
issues, sometimes using variables and analytical 
devices consistent with the macro, meso or micro 
perspective adopted.
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